This paper uses a unique panel of 30 banking systems observed over 17 years to estimate the effects of variations in bank profit, capital and reserves on the real economy. Shocks to bank profits are found to have a significant impact on GDP growth which lasts approximately two years. The effect is stronger for activities and sectors that rely more heavily on external finance, and is more pronounced in countries with a large banking sector. Bank reserves also exhibit some impact on real economic activity, though to a lesser extent than bank profit. Surprisingly, variations in bank capital do not show any significant effect on the real economy.
I. Introduction
The recent financial crisis has exposed the global banking system to a series of adverse shocks. The crisis started with a substantial fall in the value of mortgage-related securities which inflicted heavy losses on the banking sector. In some countries, a liquidity crisis has developed as uninsured deposits were suddenly withdrawn, which intermittently led to bank failures. Governments have made extensive efforts to provide assistance to the banking sector, as the continued weakness of this sector was perceived to have negative effects on the real economy. The present paper examines this hypothesis and provides new evidence on the sources, magnitude and duration of the bank effect.
The paper estimates the impact of variations in bank profits, bank capital and bank reserves on GDP growth and other real economic variables. The sample contains a panel of 30 OECD countries observed annually for 9 to 24 years starting at 1979. The main finding is that variations in bank profits have a significant impact on GDP growth lasting approximately two years. Other things equal, one percentage point decline in bank ROA (return on assets) is expected to reduce the following year's GDP growth by 0.3 percentage points. The effect is stronger for economic activities and industrial sectors that rely more heavily on external finance, and is more pronounced in countries with a large banking sector. Bank reserves (cash) also exhibit some impact on real economic activity, though to a lesser extent than ROA. Surprisingly, variations in bank capital do not show any significant impact on the real economy. This result casts some doubt on the ability of (public or private) capital injections to the banking system to stimulate economic growth, apart from their goal to prevent the consequences of bank failures which are not addressed in this study 1 .
The literature on real effects of banking shocks is not large, as most existing studies estimate the effect on the supply of loans 2 and not on real economic variables. Peek and Rosengren (2000) exploit exogenous shocks to US bank lending caused by the burst of Japan's asset price bubble in 1 Ashcraft (2005) estimates the real effects of bank failures in the US. 2 See for instance Sharpe (1995) , Kashyap and Stein (2000) and a recent study by Loutskina and Strahan (2009) .
the early 1990s and transmitted to the US through Japanese banks operating in the US. According to the authors' estimates, California, New York and Illinois have lost approximately 53% of annual construction activity as a result of a 58% decline in Japanese lending to the US real estate sector.
Calomiris and Mason (2003) study a cross section of US states and counties from the early Great
Depression years (1930) (1931) (1932) . They also find a large effect of loan contraction on the US real estate sector, stronger than the effect on total economic growth. A similar result is found in the present study where investment exhibits higher sensitivity to banking shocks than other expenditure items. The novelty of the paper is the use of a large sample of countries that goes beyond the US and spans for 17 years on average. The dataset includes annual time series of financial data on banking systems in 30 OECD countries, which have not been studied yet in the credit channel literature. This sample enables to estimate the bank effect in a general framework that is not confined to specific countries or special episodes.
The paper is related to Dell'Ariccia, Detragiache and Rajan (2008) and Kroszner, Laeven and Klingebiel (2007) who use panel datasets to study the real effects of bank crises 3 . Dell'Ariccia et al (2008) find that financially dependent industries grow more slowly during bank crises, indicating that bank crises have a differential effect on the economy. Kroszner et al (2007) show that the differential effect of the crisis is stronger in countries with a dominant banking sector. The present paper differs in two ways. First, it is able to identify both a differential effect and an aggregate effect of banking shocks. Second, the two effects are estimated in a sample which consists primarily of non-crisis periods (comprising 93%-95% of the sample). Hence, the paper documents the real effects of banking shocks that prevail regularly in non-crisis years. For instance, the paper finds that financially dependent industries are in general more sensitive to banking shocks, even in periods that are not defined as bank crises.
3 Other papers on bank crises include Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache and Gupta (2006) , Barrell, Davis and Pomerantz (2006) , Davis and Stone (2004) and Bordo et al (2001) .
The paper exploits raw financial data to measure the state of the banking sector. It distinguishes between shocks to bank profit, capital and reserves and estimates each effect separately. Hence, the impact of a liquidity shock (e.g. bank run) reducing bank reserves might be different from a profitability shock (e.g. non-performing loans). Since the bank data is pure time series, variation over time can be used to identify the bank effect. In particular, the paper makes an extensive use of dynamic panel models to estimate the real effects of the bank variables. These time-series techniques are very common in the literature on the real effects of monetary shocks. Yet to my knowledge this is the first time they are used to estimate the real effects of banking shocks.
Banking shocks and real economic activity are jointly endogenous, which complicates the estimation of the bank effect. However, the impact of a banking shock usually lasts more than one period. It takes some time until banks respond to their deteriorating (or improving) conditions and more time until the effects expand to the real economy through the lending channel. Hence, the effect of lagged banking shocks on current GDP growth can be estimated, under the assumption that the bank data is weakly exogenous. Note that the data is annual so lags can be considered predetermined variables due to the long time length between lags and current values. It seems fairly plausible to assume that bank profits in year t are not affected by next year GDP growth. This assumption enables to estimate the lagged bank effect on aggregate output.
In addition, I use industrial data to estimate the differential bank effect. Under the bank lending channel hypothesis, industries that are more dependent on external finance should be more sensitive to the financial state of the banking system, as Dell'Ariccia, Detragiache and Rajan (2008) and Kroszner, Laeven and Klingebiel (2007) have shown with regard to bank crises. In the present study I test whether these financially dependent industries are more sensitive to banking shocks during non-crisis periods. This method bypasses the endogeneity problem by concentrating on the differential effect (the correlation with aggregate variables is captured in the regression by country-year fixed effects). The results suggest that the bank effect comprises a contemporaneous effect and a lagging effect, so the total effect lasts for two years.
The choice of the bank variables is dictated by the credit channel literature. The literature emphasizes the importance of equity capital (net worth) in the process of financial intermediation.
Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and Bernanke and Gertler (1987) argue that bank capital (net worth)
alleviates moral hazard and adverse selection problems arising from information asymmetries between the bank and its depositors. Hence, banks with low equity capital face higher financing costs which affect their loan supply. Today, most countries impose legal restrictions obliging banks to hold a minimum capital-asset ratio (capital adequacy regulations). These regulations reinforce the link between bank capital and bank lending, as discussed in Chami and Cosimano (2001) and Van den Heuvel (2006) .
In the present study, capital abundance is measured by two indicators: the capital-asset ratio, and the ratio of profits to total assets, i.e. the return on assets (ROA). The capital/asset ratio is a direct measure of the stock of bank capital (relative to its size) and fits the theoretical concept in the literature 4 . ROA, which usually measures profitability, is also related to capital abundance. Profits (the nominator of ROA) provide an important source of new capital (through retained profits), especially in periods of financial distress when external sources of capital are scarce. Hence, profits capture the flow dimension of bank capital. As we shall see, the most robust results are obtained with respect to bank ROA, while the effect of the capital/asset ratio is insignificant.
The supply of loans depends also on bank reserves (cash assets). Bernanke and Blinder (1988) argue that high cash holdings reduce financial costs, since they enable to increase the issuance of reservable deposits, which are usually cheaper than other forms of bank liabilities.
Hence, the supply of loans should be positively related to the cash of the banking system. Another channel through which reserves affect the supply of loans is their role as a cushion against sudden deposit withdrawals. When reserves decline, e.g. due to deposit drain, banks tend to curtail loans and increase cash assets in order to restore their reserves to the desired level. This process reduces the supply of loans and eventually affects the real economy. In this paper, I use the ratio of cash to total assets as a measure of bank reserves 5 . The results indicate that reserves have some impact on economic growth, though it is more moderate than the effect of ROA.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the data and the identification strategy which builds on two sets of data: country data and industry data. Section III reports the results of the country-level analysis which estimates the aggregate bank effect by regressing real economic growth on lagged bank variables. The analysis examines various indicators of economic growth, sub-samples of OECD countries, bank crisis episodes and other robustness tests. Section IV reports the differential bank effect which is estimated by the industrylevel data. Section V concludes.
II. Data and Methodology

Data Description
Data on financial statements of the banking system is taken from the OECD publication Bank Profitability: Financial Statements of Banks (2004 edition). Despite the relatively broad and detailed coverage of this dataset, only few studies have investigated it. Vennet (1999) has used this data to study growth dynamics of banking sectors in OECD countries and Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2006) have studied the determinants of bank profitability. To my knowledge, this paper is the first to use the data to estimate the effect of banking activity on real economic outcomes.
5 Reserves can be normalized also by total deposits. The results (not reported) remain the same.
The OECD dataset contains data aggregated into several groups: all banks, commercial banks, large commercial banks, savings banks and other groups of banks. Since the focus of this study is on the banking system as a whole, I use the broadest available aggregate which for most countries is "all banks" (see ( Table I) ( Table II) Stationarity Table III presents basic statistics by country for the following financial indices: return on assets (ROA) defined as the ratio of aggregate annual profits to aggregate assets, bank equity capital to total assets which serves as a measure of bank capital, and cash 6 to total assets standing as bank reserves. Capital and cash exhibit a clear time trend so the first difference of these series is used in the regressions below. The return on assets is more ambiguous with respect to its stationarity property. For most countries the ROA is fairly stationary, but in some countries there seems to be an upward trend. (Table III) The series are too short to conduct figure 1 , which presents the ROA of the banking system in four OECD countries that underwent bank crises: Japan, Finland, Norway and South Korea. The variance of the series is substantially larger during the crisis periods compared to the rest of the sample. It would be interesting to test whether the bank effect stems from these crisis episodes. The analysis in the next section shows that it does not. When crisis episodes are excluded from the sample, the estimated regression hardly changes (see table IX). (Table IV) ( 
Summary statistics
Country outliers
Several tests indicate that Turkey and Mexico are outliers in the current sample of OECD countries.
Both strongly affect the regression results, especially with regard to the interest rate coefficient, which changes from negative to positive when Turkey and Mexico are included (see table IX). 
Methodology
The joint endogeneity of real and financial variables is a major obstacle to identify causality between them. Finding a pure instrumental variable is a difficult task because most of the factors that affect bank balance sheets (such as interest rates, inflation, exchange rates) are also endogenous. The present study builds on two identification strategies: dynamic and cross sectional.
The dynamic approach exploits the time series dimension of the dataset to estimate the aggregate bank effect. Since the bank variables are pure time series, their lags can be considered as weakly exogenous. This method enables to estimate the lagging effect of the bank variables on aggregate output.
The cross-sectional approach concentrates on the growth differences between different industries and estimates the differential bank effect. In this case, the endogeneity problem is minimized since the focus moves from aggregate variations over time to variation across industries, as done by Dell'Ariccia et al (2008) and Kroszner et al with respect to bank crises. These studies find that industries that are more dependent on external finance grow more slowly during bank crises. In the present paper, I estimate the differential effect of the three bank variables: ROA, CAPITAL and RESERVES. I find that financially dependent industries are more sensitive to variations in the bank variables. This result is robust to the exclusion of the bank crisis episodes (comprising 7% of the sample).
III. The Aggregate Effect
The estimated model has the following form:
(1) ε is a stochastic error. Note that the country and time fixed effects control for structural differences between countries, and global effects across time. Hence, we remain only with the variance arising from country-year specific shocks. The number of lags in all regressions is 1 year. Higher lags were found insignificant (recall that the data is annual). The main interest is in the effect of ROA, CAPITAL and RESERVES on GDP, namely coefficients β 1 , β 2 and β 3 . The inclusion of lagged dependent variable in the RHS implies that the long run effect of the bank variables is β/(1-α). However, in all the results of this paper the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is relatively small, so the difference between the short and long run effects is negligible. Since the explanatory variables are only weakly exogenous, a necessary condition for identification is that the residuals are serially uncorrelated. I report the serial correlation test developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) . As shown in table I, availability of banking statistics ranges from 7 to 25 years so the panels are unbalanced. 8 The return on assets is the ratio of aggregate annual profits to aggregate assets. Bank assets are calculated by averaging two end-year totals, 13-month, 12-month or daily balances. For more information see OECD (2004) .
Since the explanatory variables are only weakly exogenous (i.e., they are correlated with past residuals), the simple least-square-dummy-variable estimator might suffer from the dynamic panel data bias (Nickell 1981) . The bias is especially large for short panels. The current dataset has an average time length of approximately 17 years, which is quite large for panel datasets. Hence, the bias in this case is moderate (see table VIII ). Nevertheless, Arellano and Bond (1991) provide a GMM estimator which handles the problem. The estimator is derived by differencing the main equation to remove the country fixed effect. Then the lags of the RHS variables are used as instruments of the differenced explanatory variables.
The Main Results
Table VIII provides the Arellano-Bond estimator alongside the OLS estimator. The dependent variable in all the regressions is GDP growth. Column (1) presents a dynamic model with the bank variables as explanatory variables. Column (2) adds other covariates controlling for financial shocks, and column (3) includes more national account aggregates to capture a larger variety of real shocks (in addition to lagged GDP growth). All the explanatory variables are transformed to obtain stationarity, as detailed in table VII. (Table VII) ( Table VIII) Among the bank variables, ROA has the most significant effect on GDP growth. Controlling for the real interest rate 9 , inflation, real exchange rate and stock prices, the effect of ROA on next year GDP growth is estimated at around 0.26. Hence, if bank ROA declines by 1 percentage point (which is equivalent to 1.7 standard errors), next year GDP growth is expected to decline by 0.26
percentage points. The model includes the lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable suggesting that the impact of the ROA shock continues further into the future (the long-term effect 9 Since the expected rate of inflation is unavailable for all countries, the real interest rate in period t is proxied by the nominal interest rate in t net of the inflation rate from t-1 to t.
is 0.38). However, the rate of decay is quite large, so the impact of ROA is practically negligible two years after the occurrence of the shock. This result appears also in the next section where industrial data is analyzed, suggesting that the real effects of banking shocks decay after two years.
The RESERVES effect is fairly small and only marginally significant. If reserves decline by 1 standard deviation (around 1.3 percents of total assets) next year GDP growth is expected to decline by approximately 0.15 percentage points. This finding indicates that in OECD countries reserve constraints on the supply of bank loans are moderate. Financial systems in these countries provide an easy access to reserves through the role of the central bank as a lender of last resort.
Hence, banks can obtain reserves (cash) relatively easily in times of financial distress. The results might have been different in a sample of non OECD countries with less developed financial system.
The estimated effect of bank capital on GDP growth is insignificant. In fact, bank capital is found statistically insignificant in all the regressions of this study. This result casts some doubt on the ability of bailout programs to stimulate the economy. Injection of government (or private)
capital into the banking system may alleviate bankruptcy costs and the adverse effects of bank failures, but I find no statistical evidence of its ability to enhance growth. There might be some technical reasons for that, as bank capital suffers from measurement errors making it a poor gauge of capital abundance. Note that equity capital is not measured directly, but derived from the difference between assets and debt liabilities. It is estimated at the last day of the year and thus subject to daily market fluctuations. Moreover, mergers and acquisitions or new accounting rules induce artificial changes in its size. Yet, the statistical insignificance of bank capital is robust to country sub-samples as shown in table IX. It is also robust to the exclusion of outlier observations (see column [6] in table IX) which reduces measurement errors. The statistical insignificance of bank capital does not imply that the capital channel is mute. The capital channel operates also through the ROA coefficient. For example, bank loss yielding a decline both in ROA and in bank capital, will affect GDP growth through the ROA coefficient. However, an independent change in bank capital that is not related to bank profits, such as issuance of new equity shares or government bailout, does not affect GDP growth.
Table VIII provides estimates of the real effect of non-bank financial variables. The real interest rate and the inflation rate have a negative impact on GDP growth. The effect of the real exchange rate (defined as the value of domestic currency in terms of foreign currencies adjusted for domestic and foreign inflation rates) is also negative, while stock prices have a positive effect. Note that these variables also affect bank ROA so including them in the regression reduces the coefficient of ROA. Column (2) excludes Turkey and Mexico, replicating column (2) in table VIII (henceforth "the benchmark regression"). As noted earlier, the bank effect is stronger with Turkey and Mexico in the sample. However, the interest rate coefficient becomes positive, which is implausible. Note that the dynamic pattern is also changed as the coefficient of lagged GDP growth becomes insignificant, and the serial correlation of the residuals increases (see the marked decline in the P value of the hypothesis that the residuals are serially uncorrelated). These effects are due to the financial instability prevailing in Turkey and Mexico during the sample years. Hence, Turkey and Mexico are excluded from the sample in all the other regressions. (Table IX) In columns (3) and (4) (2008) by defining the duration of a crisis to be three years (including the inception year). The only exception is Japan, where I assume that the bank crisis has lasted for 11 years (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) , as is evident from the huge losses recorded up to 2002 (see figure 1 ). The total number of crisis observations is 26 (5.4% of the sample), including Italy (1990 Italy ( -1992 , Norway (1987 Norway ( -1989 , Sweden (1990 Sweden ( -1992 , Japan (1992 -2002 ), Finland (1991 -1993 and Korea (1997 Korea ( -1999 . When these observations are excluded, the ROA coefficient remains significant. Hence, the bank effect prevails not only in crisis episodes but also in normal years. Note that the bank coefficients hardly change when crisis years are excluded.
Robustness to country exclusions, GDP per capita, crisis episodes and outliers
The same result is obtained also in the next section where industrial data is analyzed.
Finally, column (6) re-estimates the main regression after dropping the first and last percentiles of all variables to control for outlier effects. Note that the ROA coefficient increases when outliers are omitted, while the other bank coefficients do not change in a significant way.
Hence, the bank effect is robust also to the exclusion of outliers. Table X substitutes GDP growth which was the dependent variable in the original regressions with the growth rates of the following variables: household consumption, government consumption, investment (fixed capital formation), import of goods and services and export of goods and services.
Testing the bank effect on other real variables
The goal is to see whether the bank effect is changing across different types of economic activities.
One would expect to find a stronger effect on activities that are more dependent on external finance.
The results support this hypothesis. The effect of bank ROA on investment growth (INVESTMENT) is estimated at 1.4, almost five times higher than the effect on consumption growth (CONSUMPTION). Capital investment requires more external finance than private consumption, so the stronger bank effect on investment is consistent with the hypothesis that causality goes from the banking sector to the real economy. Note that the models in table X include lagged dependent variable and lagged GDP growth as explanatory variables. Hence, they allow for different dynamic structures and different degree of pro-cyclicality of the dependent variables. For instance, investment growth is evidently more pro-cyclical than consumption growth (see the higher coefficient of lagged GDP growth), while the latter exhibit higher inertia (see the higher coefficient of the lagged dependent variable). Hence, the large effect of bank ROA on investment growth, compared to consumption growth, is not a result of the higher degree of pro-cyclicality of investment, as it is already taken into account by the other covariates.
( Table X) Table X provides more evidence on the existence of a bank effect on real economic activity.
Note that economic activities that are more sensitive to bank ROA are also more sensitive to interest rates and stock prices. For example, the coefficients of ROA, the real interest rate and the stock market on investment growth are 1.40, -0.76 and 0.08, respectively. The same variables have lower effect on import growth, namely, 0.91, -0.55 and 0.06, respectively. These explanatory variables capture various aspects of financing conditions. ROA determines the financial state of the banking sector, and hence the ability of banks to lend; the interest rate determines borrowing costs in the market for loans; and stock prices reflect financing conditions in the equity market through Tobin's Q. Hence, the coefficients of these variables are expected to move in the same direction (in absolute terms) as the dependent variable changes. Namely, if investment requires more external finance than import, it should be more sensitive than import to bank ROA, to the interest rate and to stock prices. This is exactly the result obtained in table X. It verifies that the ROA coefficient captures the effect of financing conditions on real economic activity.
Does the bank effect reflect a broader balance sheet channel?
The estimated effect of bank ROA on GDP growth supports the hypothesis of a bank balance sheet channel. This channel works through the dependence of the supply of loans on banks' balance sheets. When banks have abundant capital, they are more willing to take risks and expand their lending. But the results are also consistent with a broader balance sheet channel, as in Bernanke and Gertler (1989) , working through the balance sheet of the non-bank sector. For example, during recessions banks may become more selective in supplying loans to firms and households, not necessarily because of their own financial problems, but simply because borrowers become more risky as their balance sheets deteriorate. The financial state of the banking system is obviously correlated with the state of the non-bank sector, so the estimated effect of the bank variables may reflect a non-bank balance sheet channel.
The hypothesis of the non-bank balance-sheet channel has already been taken into account by the inclusion of many economic and financial controls in the regressions above. It is hard to think of business shocks that are not correlated with the various controls that already appear in the regression, particularly stock prices and national account aggregates. Yet, the data at hand enables to control for the non-bank balance sheet channel in a more direct way. The dataset contains information on bank provisions, which are highly correlated with the financial state of the non-bank sector. Bank provisions reflect actual or anticipated loan loss. When borrowers default (or are expected to default) on their bank loans, the bank records the anticipated loss in the provisions item, which is then deducted from its income. Hence, by including provisions into the regression we can control directly for shocks to the non-bank sector.
( Table XI) In table XI bank ROA is decomposed into five components, namely: net interest income, net non-interest income, operating expenses, provisions and tax. These variables are expressed as ratios of total bank assets and then differenced, so they sum up exactly to the original ROA variable in table VIII. The decomposition of ROA enables to identify the source of the bank effect. For instance, if the effect stems from the non-bank sector we would expect to find that the provision item is significant while the other components of ROA are not. Table XI shows that all the components of bank ROA affect GDP growth in the expected direction and most of them are statistically significant. Income items (interest and non-interest income) have a positive effect on GDP and expenditure items (operating expenses, provisions and tax) have a negative effect. The results reject the hypothesis that the ROA effect stems from a nonbank balance sheet channel, as provisions are not more significant than other components of ROA.
Interestingly, the effect of interest income is the strongest among all items, both economically and statistically. Since interest income is the core business of the bank, any change in this item is taken more seriously by the bank than comparable changes in other items, and the bank response in terms of lending is more pronounced.
Variation of the bank effect across countries
OECD countries are relatively homogenous so the present dataset is not ideal for identifying variations of the bank effect across counties. Nevertheless, there are some differences which can be tested, especially with regard to financial development. As table VI shows, the size of the banking system, measured by loans to GDP, is heterogeneous within the OECD group of countries, ranging from 20% to 160% (in Switzerland and Luxembourg the banking sector is even larger due to highly active international banking). Hence, the dataset is suitable for testing whether the bank effect differs according to the size of the banking system. Other measures of financial development that were examined were bank concentration, the loan/deposit and loan/asset ratios, and stock market and bond market capitalization, taken from the 2008 version of Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (1999) . The results (not reported) showed no significant impact of these financial measures on the bank effect. (Table XII) The effect of the size of the banking sector on the transmission of banking shocks is analyzed in table XII. The table re-estimates the benchmark regression, but allows the bank coefficients to change with the size of the banking system, measured by total loans to GDP. Column 
IV. The Differential Effect
The previous section estimated the bank effect on aggregate output. In this section I look at the industry level examining whether the bank variables have a differential effect. I follow Dell'Ariccia, Detragiache and Rajan (2008) The existence of a differential effect may be also consistent with the reverse causality.
Financially dependent sectors obtain more loans than other sectors, and when they default the effect on bank performance is larger. Hence, even if banks do not affect industrial production we expect to find higher correlation between financially dependent sectors and the banking system. Yet this type of correlation can exist only for large industries whose share in bank assets is high enough to affect the whole banking system. Hence, the reverse causality hypothesis can be tested by splitting the sample into small and large industries and comparing the results between the two sub-samples. If the estimated differential effect is driven by reverse causality, it should be smaller in the smallindustry sub-sample, since the bias caused by the reverse causality is lower in this case. The results of this exercise suggest that reverse causality is negligible in the current sample (see table XIV).
Dependence on external finance is measured by an index originally proposed by Rajan and Zingales (1998). They used financial data on publicly traded US firms during the 1980s and derived a measure of financial dependence which is the share of capital expenditures not financed by internal sources. Namely, financial dependence equals one minus the ratio of the firm cash flow to its capital expenditures. The crucial assumption is that financial dependence is part of the production technology of the industry. Hence, firms of the same industry but in different countries Indstat3 provides three alternative measures of industrial activity: output, value added and an index of industrial production. Output and value added are reported at current prices. They are obtained through annual census and designed to measure the level and composition of industrial activity. Output measures the value of goods produced by the industry while value added is the difference between output and input of goods and services. The industrial production index is a separate indicator designed to measure the change in industrial activity. It is compiled on a monthly or quarterly basis and carefully adjusts for price changes, classifications, sampling coverage and other distortions. Hence, on a time dimension the industrial production index is a better proxy for business fluctuations than the census output or value added. Table XIII presents summary statistics of the three variables, after excluding 1% from each side of the distribution due to outliers.
Production growth is less volatile than output and value added growth and more correlated with GDP growth. Therefore, I take the production index as the prime measure of industrial growth, but also report the results with the other two indicators. Another advantage of the production index over output and value added is data availability which is 30% higher.
( Table XIII) I assume that the bank variables and all the other macroeconomic variables are strictly exogenous. Recall that the regression includes country-industry, country-year and industry-year fixed effects, so the residuals contain only country-industry-year specific shocks. Hence, any correlation between the dependent variable and the explanatory variables arising from aggregate business fluctuations or world-wide industry shocks is already captured by the dummy variables. It leaves us with shocks that are unique to the industry, country and year. These shocks can affect the macroeconomic variables only if the industry is very large. In the present sample, more than 97% of the observations are small industries whose size is less than 3% of GDP. Hence, it seems plausible to assume that the residuals, which represent fairly small economic units, are not correlated with the bank variables and the other macroeconomic variables (after controlling for country-year specific shocks).
Main results
Table XIV presents the main results, after dropping the first and last percentiles of the distribution of production growth due to extreme outliers (some of them are distanced more than 10 standard deviations from the mean). All variables are treated as strictly exogenous except for the lagged dependent variable and lagged industry size. These two variables are only weakly exogenous and hence instrumented by their own lags in the Arellano-Bond estimator. Column (1) presents the main equation. The interaction of the external dependence index with bank ROA is positive and significant, indicating that financially dependent industries are more sensitive to variations in bank ROA. As in the country-level analysis, the effect of RESERVES is less significant than ROA, and the CAPITAL effect is generally insignificant. (Table XIV) The differential bank effect lasts for two years. It comprises a contemporaneous effect and a lagging effect. Higher lags were found insignificant, so the total length of the bank effect is two years. Note that in the country-level analysis of the previous section, the bank effect was also negligible two years after the shock, since the rate of decay was high. The same dynamics is found in Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache and Gupta (2006) . Using data on 36 bank crises in developed and developing countries, they calculate the dynamics of GDP growth (and other variables) along the crisis. They find that GDP contraction tends to last one year in addition to the crisis inception year.
Column (2) adds interactions of financial dependence with several macroeconomic variables to control for differential effects of non-bank variables. For example, financially dependent sectors may be more sensitive to interest rates or to other financial variables that are also correlated with the bank variables. It is also possible that financially dependent sectors are more pro-cyclical than other sectors. This effect is captured by the interaction of EXDEP i with the variable GDPREST ijt which denotes GDP growth of country j excluding industry i (which stands as the dependent variable). The ROA effect on the production index does not change by the inclusion of these controls, confirming the robustness of the differential effect.
As in the previous section, I examine in column (3) whether the differential effect of ROA remains significant when crisis episodes are excluded. Since the data now is at the industry level, the number of observations relating to bank crises is larger amounting to 786 observations (7.4% of the sample). The exclusion of these observations does not change the result in a significant way.
The coefficients of current and lag EXDEP*ROA change by half a standard deviation at the most, and the sum of the two coefficient stays almost the same. Hence, the estimated differential effect does not stem from crisis episodes. It reflects causal relationships between banking shocks and real economic activity prevailing generally in crisis and non-crisis years. This result complements Dell'Ariccia, Detragiache and Rajan (2008) and Kroszner, Laeven and Klingebiel (2007) who found that financially dependent industries are more sensitive to bank crises.
The identification of the differential effect depends on the assumption that there is no reverse causality. As already mentioned, the reverse causality bias should be more severe in a sample of large industries, as it hinges on the assumption that shocks at the industry level (that are not correlated with shocks at the country level captured by the country-year fixed effects) affect the whole banking system. Small industries, even if they are financially constrained, have negligible impact on the banking system, so reverse causality is less plausible in that case. Hence, we can test the existence of reverse causality by estimating the differential effect in a sample of small and large industries separately. Since the bias should be smaller in the small-industry sample, the estimated differential effect should be lower if it is driven by reverse causality. This is done in columns (4) and (5) where the sample is divided into industries that are smaller than the sample median (0.45% of GDP) and larger industries. The differential effect in the former sample is larger and more significant than the latter, contradicting the hypothesis that the results stem from reverse causality.
Finally, table XV reports the results of the main regressions with different indices of industrial growth, namely, real output growth and real value added growth (the GDP deflator is used to obtain real growth rates). These variables are noisier than the original production growth, since they do not adjust for price changes, classification, sampling coverage and other distortions. This is evident especially in the value-added regressions (columns IV-VI), where the two lags of the dependent variable are negative. In the output regressions (columns I-III) the first lag is positive but the second is negative. This finding suggests that some type of error correction dynamics resulting from measurement errors exists in the dependent variable. Nevertheless, the contemporaneous differential effect is still significantly positive, though the lagging effect is not significant. (Table XV) 
V. Summary
This paper estimates the effect of bank profits, bank capital and bank reserves on economic growth.
The focus is on short term banking shocks and their impact on the business cycle. The first section estimates the lagging effect of banking shocks on GDP growth. Profit shocks are found to have lagging effect on GDP growth. The effect is significant, both statistically and economically. It is stronger for economic activities that require higher amount of finance, such as capital investment, compared to less financially constrained activities (e.g. private or government consumption).
Furthermore, activities that are more affected by banking shocks, also exhibit higher sensitivity to interest rate shocks and stock market shocks. These results suggest that the estimated bank effect is indeed related to financing conditions. The second section exploits industry-level data and shows that industries that are more financially constrained are also more affected by banking shocks. The differential effect comprises a contemporaneous effect and a lagging effect, approximately of the same magnitude. Hence, the real effects of banking shocks seem to last for two years. This finding is consistent with the countrylevel analysis and the stylized facts on bank crises found by Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache and Gupta (2006) .
Among the bank variables tested in this paper, bank profit has the most significant impact on the real economy, while bank reserves exhibit a weaker effect. On the other hand, bank capital is found insignificant in almost all the regressions of this paper, over different specifications, dependent variables, and samples. This result suggests that increasing bank capital does not stimulate economic growth. It might be vital to prevent bank default and the huge costs associated with it, but I find no evidence of a bank capital impact on the real economy. 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 
